| 信息不对称条件下的存款保险制度 |
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| 引用本文： | 杨充,杜胜. 信息不对称条件下的存款保险制度[J]. 重庆商学院学报, 2005, 15(2): 61-64 |
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| 作者姓名： | 杨充 杜胜 |
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| 作者单位： | 西南财经大学研究生部,四川成都610074 |
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| 摘 要： | 信息不对称现象广泛存在于经济生活中,它是指合约双方由于所处地位的不同使得彼此对信息的了解存在差异,而道德风险与逆向选择则是其必然产生的一对结果.存款保险制度自创立以来,一直与信息不对称相伴,道德风险与逆向选择使得该制度的作用在各国受到了广泛质疑.
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| 关 键 词： | 信息不对称 道德风险 逆向选择 存款保险制度 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-6439（2005）02-0061-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-12-01 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-12-01 |
On deposit insurance system under condition of information asymmetry |
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| YANG Chong,DU Sheng. On deposit insurance system under condition of information asymmetry[J]. Journal of Chongqing Institute of Commerce, 2005, 15(2): 61-64 |
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| Authors: | YANG Chong DU Sheng |
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| Abstract: | Asymmetric information,which is defined that there are differences in knowledge of information for each parties of contract,exists in economic activities extensively.Furthermore,moral hazard and adverse selection are a pair of inevitable outcomes of asymmetric information.Since the deposit insurance system was established in westem courtries,it had always been disturbed by asymmetric-irformation.And the deposit insurance system is doubted by the authorities in many countries because of moral hazard and adverse selection. |
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| Keywords: | asymmetric information moral hazard adverse selection deposit insurance system |
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