COMPLEMENTARY MEASURES TO FOREIGN AID: TAIWAN AND THE PRC UNDER DIPLOMATIC RIVALRY

The competition on foreign aid, as a means for securing foreign policy and other benefits by the donor, can lead to diplomatic rivalry. This article utilizes a game theoretic model to analyze the existing rivalry for foreign aid and international status between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. Similar to the role of political contributions in the public choice theory, foreign aid is taken a means of international lobbying, to realize the donor's objective. Research results, based on the policy effect consideration, indicates that the equilibrium aid policy, which is endogenously determined, renders an inability on the part of the donors, which affects the recipient's optimal foreign policy. How does a donor obtain favorable outcomes when such rivalry exists? Strengthening diplomatic endeavors to realize the access effect has been proved an effective method. Analytical results have shown that this method not only complements aid rivalry but also increases the welfare of the donor.