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Existence of equilibria in countable games: An algebraic approach
Institution:1. Department of Mathematics, University of Southampton, University Road, SO17 1BJ Southampton, UK;2. Engineering & System Design Pillar, SUTD, 20 Dover Drive, Singapore 138682, Singapore;1. Department of Economics, Boston University, 270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA, 02215, United States of America;2. School of Economics, University of New South Wales, Australian School of Business, Sydney 2052, Australia;3. Department of Economics, Keio University, 2-15-45 Mita Minato-ku, Tokyo 108-8345, Japan;1. Department of Mathematics and Statistics, York University, Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3, Canada;2. School of Mathematics, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610064, China
Abstract:Although mixed extensions of finite games always admit equilibria, this is not the case for countable games, the best-known example being Wald?s pick-the-larger-integer game. Several authors have provided conditions for the existence of equilibria in infinite games. These conditions are typically of topological nature and are rarely applicable to countable games. Here we establish an existence result for the equilibrium of countable games when the strategy sets are a countable group, the payoffs are functions of the group operation, and mixed strategies are not requested to be σ-additive. As a byproduct we show that if finitely additive mixed strategies are allowed, then Wald?s game admits an equilibrium. Finally we extend the main results to uncountable games.
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