Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin? |
| |
| Institution: | 1. School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;2. Lyles School of Civil Engineering, Purdue University, 550 Stadium Mall Drive West Lafayette, IN 47906, USA |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a strategic model of common value elections with endogenous information acquisition. It proves that majoritarian elections can fail to aggregate information when voters have heterogeneous skills and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for information aggregation. Inefficiencies can be partially corrected by limiting participation to the most competent citizens, a result which provides a rational foundation for epistocratic government. |
| |
| Keywords: | Endogenous information acquisition Heterogeneity Condorcet?s Jury Theorem |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
