Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata |
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| Institution: | 1. Kyoto University, Oiwake-cho, Kitashirakawa, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8502, Japan;2. Key Lab of Animal Ecology and Conservation Biology, Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Datun Road, Chaoyang, Beijing 100101, P. R. China |
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| Abstract: | We discuss the emergence of cooperation in repeated Trust Mini-Games played by finite automata. Contrary to a previous result obtained by Piccione and Rubinstein (1993), we first prove that this repeated game admits two Nash equilibria, a cooperative and a non-cooperative one. Second, we show that the cooperative equilibrium is the only (cyclically) stable set under the so-called best response dynamics. |
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