Breaking the elected rules in a field experiment on forestry resources |
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| Institution: | 1. Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287, USA;2. CIRAD-GREEN, Campus Baillarguet, Montpellier, Cedex 5, France;3. Department of Economics, Universidad de los Andes, Calle 19A No. 1-37 Este (W-803), Bogotá, Colombia;4. Research Group on Institutions and Rural Development of the School of Environmental and Rural Studies, Universidad Javeriana, Transv. 4 # 42-00 (Piso 8), Bogotá, Colombia;5. Department of Biology, Faculty of Science, Chulalongkorn University, Pathumwan, Bangkok 10330, Thailand;1. Programa Magíster en Economía de Recursos Naturales y del Medio Ambiente, Universidad de Concepción, Victoria 471, Barrio Universitario, Concepción, Chile;2. Centro de Conservación Marina, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile;3. Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción, Victoria 471, Barrio Universitario, Concepción, Chile;4. Interdisciplinary Center for Aquaculture Research (INCAR), Chile;5. Research Nucleus on Environmental and Natural Resource Economics (NENRE), Chile;1. University of Aveiro, NIMA and GOVCOPP, Portugal;2. School of Public Policy, University of California Riverside, United States;3. University of Minho and NIMA, Portugal;4. Gary Anderson School of Business Administration, University of California Riverside, United States;1. Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), VU University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands;2. Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), The Hague, The Netherlands;3. Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats (ICREA), Barcelona, Spain;4. Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain;5. Bolivian Center for Research and Integral Social Development (CBDISI), La Paz, Bolivia;6. Universidad Mayor de San Simon (UMSS), Cochabamba, Bolivia;1. Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University, 186 Rubenstein Hall, Box 90312, Durham, NC 27708, USA;2. Facultad de Administración, Universidad de Los Andes, Calle 21 # 1–20 Ed. SD, Bogotá, Colombia;3. School of Rural and Environmental Studies, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Transv 4 # 42 - 00. 8th floor, Bogotá, Colombia;4. Consultant Office of Evaluation and Oversight, Inter-American Development Bank, USA |
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| Abstract: | Harvesting from common resources has been studied through experimental work in the laboratory and in the field. In this paper we report on a dynamic commons experiment, representing a forest, performed with different types of communities of resource users in Thailand and Colombia, as well as student participants. We find that all groups overharvest the resource in the first part of the experiment and that there is no statistical difference between the various types of groups. In the second part of the experiment, participants appropriate the common resource after one of three possible regulations is elected and implemented. There is less overharvesting after the rules are implemented, but there is a significant amount of rule breaking. The surprising finding is that Colombian villagers break the rules of the games more often than other groups, and even more so when they have more trust in members of the community. This observation can be explained by the distrust in externally proposed regulations due to the institutional and cultural context. |
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