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Bilateral k+1-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
Affiliation:1. Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), Germany;2. Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany;3. Department of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218, United States;1. Computer Science Department, Holon Institute of Technology (HIT), Holon, Israel;2. School of Computer Science and Engineering, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel;1. European University in St. Petersburg, 3 Gagarinskaya Street, St. Petersburg, 191187, Russia;2. St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics (Russian Academy of Sciences), 1 Tchaikovsky Street, St. Petersburg, 191187, Russia;3. Department of Economics and Finance, Montclair State University, Montclair, NJ 07043, USA;1. Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States;2. Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, United States;1. Faculty of Mathematics, Computer Sciences and Econometrics, University of Zielona Góra, Poland;2. Department of Economics, Arizona State University, USA;3. Department of Quantitative Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, al. Niepodległości 162, 02-554 Warszawa, Poland
Abstract:
Keywords:Asymmetric auctions  Double auction  First-price auction  Partnership dissolution  Detail-free mechanism
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