Conservative belief and rationality |
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| Institution: | 1. Centre for Primary Care, Wolfson Institute of Population Health, Barts School of Medicine and Dentistry, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK;2. Practice Dr. Lammel, Ramsau am Dachstein, Austria;3. Institute of General Practice and Evidence-based Health Services Research, Medical University of Graz, Graz, Austria;4. Institute of General Practice, Goethe-University Frankfurt am Main, Frankfurt am Main, Germany;5. Center for Virology, Medical University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria;6. Big Data Institute, Li Ka Shing Centre for Health Information and Discovery, Nuffield Department for Medicine, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK;7. The Queen''s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK;8. Institute for Global Health, University College London, London, UK;9. Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria;10. London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK |
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| Abstract: | Players? beliefs may be incompatible, in the sense that player i can assign probability 1 to an event E to which player j assigns probability 0. One way to block incompatibility is to assume a common prior. We consider here a different approach: we require players? beliefs to be conservative, in the sense that all players must ascribe the actual world positive probability. We show that common conservative belief of rationality (CCBR) characterizes strategies in the support of a subjective correlated equilibrium where all players? beliefs have common support. We also define a notion of strong rationalizability, and show that it is characterized by CCBR. |
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| Keywords: | Conservative belief of rationality Rationalizability Correlated equilibrium |
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