Cooperation,imitation and partial rematching |
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| Institution: | 1. Institut für Diskrete Mathematik, TU Graz, Steyrergasse 30, Graz A-8010, Austria;2. Warwick Business School, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom;3. Department of Computer Science, RWTH Aachen, Ahornstr. 35, D-52056 Aachen, Germany;1. Institute of Management and Economics, Clausthal University of Technology, Julius-Albert-Str. 2, Clausthal-Zellerfeld 38678, Germany;2. Helmut Schmidt University, Department of Economics and Social Science and the Research Group FOR2104 (sponsored by the German Research Foundation), Holstenhofweg 85, Hamburg 22043, Germany;1. West Pomeranian University of Technology, faculty of Computer Science and Information Technology, Zolnierska 49, Szczecin 71-210, Poland |
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| Abstract: | We study a setting in which imitative players are matched into pairs to play a Prisoner?s Dilemma game. A well-known result in such setting is that under random matching cooperation vanishes for any interior initial condition. The novelty of this paper is that we consider partial rematching: players that belong to a pair in which both parties cooperate repeat partner next period, while all other players are randomly matched into pairs. Under certain conditions, this rematching mechanism makes cooperation the unique outcome in the long run. Furthermore, we show that if imitation happens infrequently enough then cooperative behavior is always present in the population. |
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