The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models |
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| Institution: | 1. Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511, United States;2. Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, United States;3. Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, United States;1. Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Department of Management, San Giobbe, Cannaregio 873, 30121 Venezia, Italy;2. Nanyang Technological University, Division of Economics, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798, Singapore;1. Department of Economics, Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey;2. Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers, Lirsa, Paris, France;3. Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey |
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| Abstract: | In costly voting models, voters abstain when a stochastic cost of voting exceeds the benefit from voting. In probabilistic voting models, they always vote for a candidate who generates the highest utility, which is subject to random shocks. We prove an equivalence result: In two-candidate elections, given any costly voting model, there exists a probabilistic voting model that generates winning probabilities identical to those in the former model for any policy announcements, and vice versa. Thus many predictions of interest established in one of the models hold in the other as well, providing robustness of the conclusions to model specifications. |
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| Keywords: | Electoral competition Costly voting Probabilistic voting Equivalence |
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