策略性采购联盟、集体谈判与最优贸易政策选择——基于广义Cournot-Nash谈判函数的分析

文章发展了一个关于由本国企业组成的中间品策略性采购联盟与外国垄断性供给者进行集体谈判的模型一—该模型以中国的制造业外包服务，即出口加工贸易实践为基础，其中，中间品的采购价格与数量通过有效的Nash谈判过程同时决定。当采购联盟的效用函数的数量弹性高于（低于）价格弹性，则该联盟的偏好为数量（价格）导向的。文章证明：（1）当本国与外国的中间品与最终产品贸易具有互补性时，政府贸易政策调整的价格、数量以及福利效应是不确定的，它们依存于本国采购联盟的偏好、最终产品需求曲线的弹性与曲率、外国企业的技术以及生产专业化程度；（2）政府贸易政策的干预功能与企业策略性联盟的自主调整功能存在重叠与冲突。

Strategic Procurement-Coalition,Collective Bargaining and the Optimal Trade Policy Choice:The Analysis Based on the Generalized Cournot-Nash Bargaining Power

This paper develops a model of strategic procurement-coalition and the foreign monopolist supplier.The model is based on China's outsourcing activity in manufacture,namely the export-processing trade.The procurement price and quantity of the intermediates are simultaneously determined through Nash bargaining.The procurement-coalition can be quantity(price) oriented if the quantity elasticity in its utility function is higher(lower) than the price elasticity.This paper suggests that:(1) When the trade of intermediates and that of the final product are complementary,the price,quantity and welfare effects of the adjustment of the trade policy are ambiguous.These effects depends mainly on the following factors: the preference of home strategic procurement-coalition,the price elasticity of demand curve of the final product and the technology of the foreign firm;(2) Government's intervening function of trade policy overlaps and conflicts with the procurement-coalition's self-management.