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中小企业管理监督与员工努力程度影响分析
引用本文:柴国荣,赵雷.中小企业管理监督与员工努力程度影响分析[J].商业研究,2011(9):1-6.
作者姓名:柴国荣  赵雷
作者单位:兰州大学管理学院,兰州,730000
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目,项目编号:70702013,71072070;教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”项目;中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目,项目编号:11LZUJBWZD001
摘    要:随着知识经济时代的到来,企业监督机制不再是保证员工努力工作的重要手段。本文基于企业和员工两大主体建立了不对称的演化博弈模型,分析了企业管理监督对员工努力程度影响的演化路径、演化结果及其现实意义,研究结果表明企业管理监督与员工努力程度成负相关,演化结果受监督代价、惩罚成本、监督效用和竞争环境等因素的影响。

关 键 词:心理契约  管理监督  演化博弈

Analysis of the Impact of the Small - and - Medium Enterprise's Administrative Supervision on Employee's Effort Level
CHAI Guo-rong,ZHAO Lei.Analysis of the Impact of the Small - and - Medium Enterprise's Administrative Supervision on Employee's Effort Level[J].Commercial Research,2011(9):1-6.
Authors:CHAI Guo-rong  ZHAO Lei
Institution:(School of Management,Lanzhou University,Lanzhou 730000,China)
Abstract:With the arrival of the era of knowledge economy,enterprise′s oversight mechanisms are no longer an important means to make sure employees to work hard.Based on two subjects of enterprise and employee,this paper proposes an asymmetric evolutionary game model and studies its evolutionary path,evolutionary result and practical significance.The results show that enterprise′s supervision is negative correlation with employee′s effort level and the evolutionary results depend on factors of the cost of supervision,the cost of penalty,the effectiveness of supervision and competitive environment.
Keywords:psychological contract  administrative supervision  evolutionary game
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