首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

高级管理人员激励契约研究
引用本文:潘飞,石美娟,童卫华. 高级管理人员激励契约研究[J]. 中国工业经济, 2006, 0(3): 68-74
作者姓名:潘飞  石美娟  童卫华
作者单位:上海财经大学,上海,200433
基金项目:教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地项目
摘    要:本文首次通过收集上市公司披露的高级管理人员激励契约,对我国现阶段高级管理人员激励契约的现状和存在的问题进行了分析和研究。研究发现:我国上市公司中高级管理人员职责不清,容易出现高级管理人员自己给自己制定报酬、考核业绩的现象;我国高级管理人员业绩评价主要依赖财务指标(净利润、利润总额、净资产收益率),非财务指标与主观评价指标在高级管理人员业绩评价中使用较少;高级管理人员的业绩标准主要是董事会制定的预算指标:高级管理人员业绩评价指标的确定比较简单,往往没有考虑高级管理人员操纵会计指标的可能性。以及不可控因素对评价指标的影响。

关 键 词:高级管理人员  激励契约  业绩评价
文章编号:1006-480X(2006)03-0068-07
收稿时间:2006-01-10
修稿时间:2006-01-10

Study of the Incentive Contracts of Top Management
PAN Fei,SHI Mei-juan,TONG Wei-hua. Study of the Incentive Contracts of Top Management[J]. China Industrial Economy, 2006, 0(3): 68-74
Authors:PAN Fei  SHI Mei-juan  TONG Wei-hua
Abstract:Collecting the incentive contracts of China's listed company,we study the actuality and problem in incentive contracts of top management.The study reveals that the top management's responsibility is not clear in China's listed company,so it is easy to be situation that the top management decide compensation and assess performance for themselves;performance measures are largely depend on financial performance measures,including net income,pre-tax net income and returns on equity;non-financial performance measures and subjective performance measures is not often used.Performance standards are often based on budgets established by directorate;the top manager's performance measure is so simple that it does not consider the possibility of earnings management by top management and influence of something not controlled by top management.
Keywords:top management   incentive contracts   performance evaluation
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号