Balanced Contributions Axiom in the Solution of Cooperative Games |
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Authors: | Francisco Sánchez S |
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Institution: | Centro de Investigación en Matemáticas A.C, Apartado Postal 402, C.P. 36240, Guanajuato, Guanajuato, México |
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Abstract: | In a gamevin characteristic function form, suppose the Banzhaf value ψ is used to pay a coalitionSalready formed. Then coalitionSno longer receivesv(S); instead it receivesRψ(S) = ∑i ∈ Sψi(vs), wherevSdenotes the subgame of coalitionS. Surprisingly, the Shapley value of this new game Sh(N, Rψ) is equal to the Banzhaf value ofv. In this paper we establish a similar result for all values satisfying balanced contributions axiom. Additionally, we introduce player's weights to obtain the corresponding result in the nonsymmetric case.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C71 |
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