One-Shot Public Mediated Talk |
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| Authors: | Ehud Lehrer Sylvain Sorin |
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| Affiliation: | aDepartment of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Department of Mathematics, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, Illinois, 60208;bSchool of Mathematical Sciences, Sackler Faculty of Exact Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 69978, Israel;cLaboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 1 rue Descartes, Paris, 75005, France;dModalX, UFR SEGMI, Université Paris X, 200 Avenue de la Republique, 92001, Nanterre, France |
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| Abstract: | We show that any correlation device with rational coefficients can be generated by a mechanism, where each player sends a private message to a mediator who in turn makes a public deterministic announcement. It is then shown that the mechanism can be adapted also to situations with differential information, where the correlation device itself depends on the players' private messages that may vary with their realized types. All the mechanisms suggested are immunized against individual deviations. Therefore, by using them, players can implement any correlated or communication equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72. |
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