Vacuous Information Affects Bargaining |
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| Authors: | Christian Korth J. Philipp Reiß |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics VWL IV, University of Bayreuth, 95440, Bayreuth, Germany
2. Institute of Economics, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Schlossbezirk 14, 76131, Karlsruhe, Germany
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| Abstract: | We introduce vacuous information into buyer-seller ultimatum exchanges and provide evidence that it can affect bargaining outcomes. Notably bargaining behavior is affected asymmetrically in a way that leads allocative efficiency to respond negatively. Our results are consistent with self-serving bias that commands players to interpret vacuous information in a self-serving way. |
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