Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity |
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Authors: | Andreas Westermark |
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Institution: | Department of Economics, Uppsala University, PO Box 513 S-751 20, Uppsala, Sweden |
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Abstract: | This paper studies a model of how political parties use resources for campaigning to inform voters. Each party has a predetermined ideology drawn from some distribution. Parties choose a platform and campaign to inform voters about the platform. We find that, the farther away parties are from each other (on average), the less resources are spent on campaigning (on average). Thus, if parties are extreme, less information is supplied than if parties are moderate. We also show that if a public subsidy is introduced, we have policy convergence, given some mild technical restrictions on the public subsidy. |
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Keywords: | Author Keywords: Political parties Campaigning |
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