| Abstract: | Like Nelson (2002), I make a case for bringing institutions into evolutionary economics. But unlike Nelson, who defines institutions as social technologies consisting of rules-routines, I define them in agreement with North (1990) as humanly devised rules-constraints - such as formal law and informal social norms - but also view them, to accommodate most of Nelson's approach, as constraining the variety of rules-routines employable by agents. I show that this definition has advantages for communicating with modern institutional analysis, for clarifying how institutions can influence, and be influenced by, changes in physical and social technologies, and for producing policy implications.JEL Classification:
B52, B15, N01, A10I thank Niclas Berggren, Thrainn Eggertsson, Gunnar Eliasson, Geoffrey Hodgson, Dan Johansson, Nils Karlson, Staffan Laestadius, Richard Nelson, Mark Perlman, Viktor Vanberg, Gerhard Wegner, the participants of seminars at the University of Jena and the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments on earlier drafts. |
