跨期总额控制、预算执行规则弱化与辖区公共支出绩效

本文采用2008-2017年中国31个省级辖区的面板数据,在区分经常性与资本性地方公共支出的基础上,代表性地考察了社会治安、社会保障、环境保护、基础设施建设四类以结果导向为主的公共支出绩效指标体系,并以财政资金使用非遵从度与跨期财政支出总额控制指数两个核心指标分别描述短期预算执行规则弱化与跨期财政支出总额控制,进而运用广义矩估计(GMM)方法展开实证研究。结果显示:(1)短期预算执行规则弱化对财政经常性支出与资本性支出的绩效影响截然相反。(2)跨期财政支出总额控制的严格约束对促进经常性与资本性支出绩效的提高起到相似的推动作用。(3)跨期财政支出总额控制与短期预算执行规则弱化对财政经常性与资本性支出绩效存在不同的交互效应。

Intertemporal Total Control,Weakening Budget Implementation Rules and Public Expenditure Performance

Based on the panel data of 31 provinces in China from 2008 to 2017,this paper makes a representative study of four result-oriented public expenditure performance index systems,namely,public order,social security,environmental protection,and infrastructure construction,which are based on the distinction between recurrent and capital local public expenditure.By using two indicators of non-compliance of financial fund use and dependency of excess debt to respectively describe the weakening of short-term budget implementation rules and the total control of intertemporal fiscal expenditure,we use GMM method to carry out empirical research.The results show that:(1)The weakening of the short-term budget implementation rules has the opposite effect on the performance of the current expenditure and capital expenditure.(2) The strict total control of intertemporal fiscal expenditure plays a similar role in promoting the performance of recurrent and capital expenditure.(3) There are different interaction effects between the total control of intertemporal fiscal expenditure and the weakening of the short-term budget implementation rules on the recurrent and capital fiscal expenditure.