| 基建项目寻租行为各相关利益主体的博弈分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 王宇静.基建项目寻租行为各相关利益主体的博弈分析[J].基建优化,2007,28(6):26-28. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 王宇静 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 同济大学,经济管理学院,上海,200092 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 寻租行为的产生是造成国家固定资产投资效率低下的根源之一.文章分析了基本建设项目寻租行为相关利益主体即国家、政府官员和承包商三方之间的博弈关系,建立了三方的博弈模型,对寻租行为发生的条件进行了讨论,并得出了三方博弈的均衡解.最后根据分析结果对如何降低寻租行为发生的概率提出了几点建议.
|
| 关 键 词： | 基本建设项目 寻租 博弈 均衡解 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-7717(2007)06-0026-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年3月19日 |
Game Analysis among Parties Relevant to the Activity of Rent Seeking in Basic Construction Project |
| |
| WANG Yu-jing.Game Analysis among Parties Relevant to the Activity of Rent Seeking in Basic Construction Project[J].Optimization of Capital Construction,2007,28(6):26-28. |
| |
| Authors: | WANG Yu-jing |
| |
| Abstract: | The activity of rent seeking is one of the basic reasons that lead to the low efficiency of investment of permanent assets.Game relationship among nation,government officer and contractor has been analyzed and game model has been formulated.The conditions that the activity of rent seeking happens have been discussed and the equilibrium has been worked out as well.At last,some suggestions about how to decrease the probability of rent seeking have been given in accordance with the results of game analysis. |
| |
| Keywords: | Basic construction project rent-seeing game equilibrium |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
