| 对我国腐败问题的制度经济学思考 |
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| 引用本文： | 李博. 对我国腐败问题的制度经济学思考[J]. 辽宁税务高等专科学校学报, 2006, 18(4): 69-71 |
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| 作者姓名： | 李博 |
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| 作者单位： | 东北财经大学,社会学系,辽宁,大连,116025 |
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| 摘 要： | 制度经济学的研究表明,社会的资源配置由产权决定,便形成寻利的社会,由行政权决定时,就形成一种寻租的社会。近年我国腐败现象的增加与体制转型时期的矛盾特别是产权制度安排密切相关,表现在政府的经济活动范围过大,行政权往往大于产权;行政的随意性控制问题突出。反腐败的治本之策是以制度来遏制腐败,从制度入手来治理腐败问题。
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| 关 键 词： | 腐败 寻租 制度经济学 产权 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-2859(2006)04-0069-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-04-24 |
A study on the corruption in China from the standpoint of institutional economics |
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| LI Bo. A study on the corruption in China from the standpoint of institutional economics[J]. Liaoning Taxation College Journal, 2006, 18(4): 69-71 |
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| Authors: | LI Bo |
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| Abstract: | The research of institutional economics shows that if the allocation of resources is determined by the property right,then the society will be one which is benefit-seeking;in contrast,if the allocation of resources is determined by the administrative power,the society will be one which is rent-seeking.The increase of corruption in recent years in China is closely related to the system of property right.It is embodied in such aspects as the overwhelming economy-related activities of governments and the arbitrary decision-making in administration.The basic tactic should be to contain the corruption by the rules and regulations. |
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| Keywords: | corruption rent-seeking institutional economics property right |
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