Experiment-inspired comments on John Roemer’s theory of cooperation |
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Authors: | Antoni Bosch-Domènech |
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Institution: | Barcelona GSE, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain |
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Abstract: | AbstractWe report on a nonsocial experiment where we find that all participants choose the dominant strategy in the experimental payoff, and compare it with the payoff-isomorphic, but social, Prisoner’s Dilemma treatment presented in a recent paper by Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre where 28% choose cooperation instead of the dominant strategy. The contrast reinforces Roemer’s emphasis on human cooperation. Next, we argue that Roemer’s Simple Kantian Equilibrium works well as a theory of cooperation under the assumption of monotonicity (positive or negative externalities), but not when efficient cooperation requires the division of labor by coordinating dissimilar tasks. |
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Keywords: | Cooperation Roemer Kant experiments Prisoner’s dilemma monotonicity externalities symmetry Cournot-Nash |
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