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Asymmetric information and legal investor protection
Institution:1. AQR-IREA Research Group, Department of Econometrics, Statistics, and Spanish Economy, University of Barcelona. Av. Diagonal, 690. 08034 Barcelona, Spain;2. Department of Applied Economics, University of Zaragoza. Gran Vía, 4, 50005 Zaragoza, Spain;1. Department of Economics, Ohio State University, 1945 N. High Street, Columbus, OH 43210-1172, United States;2. Department of Psychology, Ohio State University, 1835 Neil Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210, United States;1. Universidad de Alicante, Spain;2. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain;1. Newcastle University Business School, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 4SE, UK;2. Department of Economics, University of Bath, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK;1. Department of Economics, National Taipei University, Taiwan, ROC;2. Institute of Mathematics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC
Abstract:This article analyses how legal investor protection can be used in order to resolve a credit rationing problem due to asymmetry of information between entrepreneurs and investors.
Keywords:
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