Gifts,bequests and family incentives |
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| Institution: | 1. Université Mohammed V, Rabat, Morroco;2. LEN, Faculté des Sciences Économiques, chemin de la Censive du Tertre, BP 52231, 44322 Nantes Cedex, France; CNAV et INED, Paris;1. University of Bonn, CASTLE, Bonn, Germany;2. University of Marburg, Public Economics Group, Am Plan 2, 35037 Marburg, Germany;3. CESifo, Munich, Germany;1. Department of Economics and Social Science, Catholic University, Via Emilia Parmense 84, 29100, Piacenza, Italy;2. Department of Economics and Finance, Catholic University, Largo Gemelli 1, 20100, Milano, Italy;1. Queen Mary University of London, School of Business and Management, Mile End Road, London E1 4NS, UK;2. Kent Business School, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7PE, UK;3. Department of Economics, University of Thessaly, Korai 43, 38333, Volos, Greece;1. University of British Columbia, Department of Computer Science, Canada;2. Computer Science Department, Cornell University, United States;3. Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Israel |
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| Abstract: | In this note, we use the theory of incentive contracting to characterize the pattern of financial transfers within the family. Using an altruistic model based on bounded rationality with one parent and two children, we show that the parent may provide a lower gift to the less well-off child, while bequests are always compensatory. |
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