Bundling,tying, and collusion |
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| Institution: | 1. Mayo Clinic Division of Hematology, Rochester, MN, USA;2. Mayo Clinic College of Medicine and Mayo Foundation, Rochester, MN, USA;1. The University of Michigan Medical School, The University of Michigan Health System, The University of Michigan Food Allergy Center, Ann Arbor, Mich;2. Anaphylaxis Australia, Hornsby, New South Wales, Australia;3. The Global Food Protection Institute, Battle Creek, Mich;1. LAMETA, University of Montpellier, France;2. ART-Dev, University of Perpignan Via Domitia, France;3. LAMETA, University of Montpellier, Faculty of Economics, Espace Richter, av. Raymond Dugrand, CS 79606 34960 Montpellier cedex 2, France;1. Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Rd., Evanston, IL 60208, United States;2. Department of Economics, University of Illinois, 1407 W. Gregory Dr., Urbana, IL 61801-3606, United States;3. Department of Finance, London School of Economics, Houghton St., London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom |
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| Abstract: | Tying a good produced monopolistically with a complementary good produced in an oligopolistic market in which there is room for collusion can be profitable if some buyers of the oligopoly good have no demand for the monopoly good. The reason is that a tie makes part of the demand in the oligopolistic market out of the reach of the tying firm's rivals, which decreases the profitability of deviating from a collusive agreement. Tying may thus facilitate collusion. It may also allow the tying firm to alter market share allocation in a collusive oligopolistic market. |
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