Voluntary disclosure of information when firms are uncertain of investor response |
| |
Institution: | 1. London Business School, United Kingdom;2. University of Washington, United States;3. Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany;1. MIT Sloan School of Management, United States\n;2. Boston College, United States\n |
| |
Abstract: | A firm may prefer not to disclose its private information if it is uncertain of investor response. In the setting under consideration, a firm needs to acquire capital from an investor. The investor can choose to invest in the firm, the risk free asset or in some alternative risky investment opportunity. It is shown that in a partial disclosure equilibrium, the firm discloses average information and withholds bad and good information. Disclosure of average information arises to attract the investor's capital away from the risk free asset. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|