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Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security
Authors:Email author" target="_blank">Todd?L?CherryEmail author  Jason?F?Shogren
Institution:(1) Department of Economics, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608-2051, USA;(2) Department of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071-3985, USA
Abstract:This paper examines how transaction costs affect Coasean bargaining with secure and insecure property rights in the lab. Consistent with the theory that secure property rights lowers the cost of non-cooperation, we find that bargaining efficiency is inversely related to property right security. Less secure property rights increased economic efficiency twofold. Property owners with secure rights are more likely to opt for their riskless outside option rather than pay the costs of bargaining.
Keywords:bargaining  Coase theorem  property rights  valuation
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