财务报告舞弊行政处罚严厉程度与审计意见购买

以2002-2008年间非金融类、非外资类正常交易A股公司为研究样本,考察财务报告舞弊行政处罚严厉程度与审计意见购买的关系。实证结果表明,财务报告舞弊行政处罚越严厉,越能显著地降低审计客户通过变更审计师购买审计意见的概率,越能显著降低审计客户盈利能力的增加或债务水平的降低,进而达到审计意见改善的目的。

Level of Administrative Penalty on Financial Reporting Fraud and Auditing Opinion Shopping

Using normally trading A Share Companies in Chinese capital market during 2002 and 2008 which do not belong to finance industry and issue foreign shares,this paper investigates relationship between the level of administrative penalty on financial reporting fraud and the auditing opinion shopping.The empirical results show that high level of administrative penalty on financial reporting fraud significantly decreases possibility of auditing opinion shopping by auditors change,and decreases the possibility of auditing opinion improvement due to profitability increase and liability level decrease.