市场化进程、企业特征与高管薪酬—业绩敏感性

结合中国市场化改革的制度背景,就不同地区市场化进程差异对企业高管薪酬契约的影响进行理论分析和实证检验,结果发现:随着市场化进程的加快,高管薪酬与会计业绩的敏感性降低,与市场业绩的敏感性增加,这表明市场化改革的深化改变了高管薪酬契约中不同业绩指标所占比重的大小;同时,区分不同性质和行业的研究发现,市场化进程对国有企业高管薪酬—业绩敏感性的影响显著大于非国有企业,对保护性行业高管薪酬—业绩敏感性的影响显著小于竞争性行业,这表明市场化进程的宏观背景对不同性质和行业的企业高管激励契约的影响程度存在差异。

Marketization Process, Characteristics of the Enterprise and Executive Pay-performance Sensitivity

Based on the background of marketization reform,the paper analyzes and tests the influences of difference region’s marketization on executive compensation contracts.The result shows that,as marketization speeding up,susceptibility of executive compensation and accounting performance is reduced,sensitivity of market performance increases,which indicates that marketization reform has changed the proportion of different performance indexes in executive compensation contracts;The study which distinguishes different properties and industry found that effects of marketization on executive pay-performance sensitivity are more significant in state-owned enterprises than in non-state-owned ones,the effects are less notable in protective industry than in competitive industries,which indicates that the influence degree of macroscopic background of marketization for different properties and industry’s executives incentive contracts is different.