Product market competition,incentives and fraudulent behavior |
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| Authors: | Rainer Andergassen |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Chest Medicine, Taipei Veterans General Hospital, Taipei 112, Taiwan R.O.C;2. Institute of Clinical Medicine, School of Medicine, National Yang-Ming University, Taipei 112, Taiwan R.O.C;3. School of Medicine, National Yang-Ming University, Taipei 112, Taiwan R.O.C;4. Department of Medical Research and Education, National Yang-Ming University Hospital, I-Lan, Taiwan R.O.C;5. Institute of Clinical Medicine and Institute of Brain Science, National Yang-Ming University, Taipei 112, Taiwan R.O.C;6. Laboratory of Neurophysiology and Department of Neurology, Taipei Veterans General Hospital, Taipei 112, Taiwan R.O.C;2. University of Alabama at Birmingham, Department of Anesthesiology and Perioperative Medicine, Division of Cardiothoracic Anesthesiology, Birmingham, AL;3. University of Tennessee Graduate School of Medicine, Department of Anesthesiology, Section on Cardiothoracic Anesthesiology, Knoxville, TN;4. Vanderbilt University Medical Center, Department of Anesthesiology, Nashville, TN |
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| Abstract: | The present paper studies incentive provision in a model where a manager can affect the firm's stock price by exerting unobservable effort and through costly, deceptive signalling and investigates the role product market competition plays in shaping shareholders' trade-off between inducing effort and fraud. |
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