Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists |
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| Authors: | Dan Bernhardt Mattias K. Polborn |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Economics & Management, Beijing Information Science & Technology University, Haidian, Beijing, China;2. Donlinks School of Economics & Management, University of Science & Technology Beijing, Haidian, Beijing, China;3. School of Economics & Management, Beijing University of Technology, Chaoyang, Beijing, China |
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| Abstract: | How should countries defend against committed terrorists who attack until defeated? We identify a fundamental non-convexity—one only needs to defeat the terrorist once. Consequently, provided a country values targets similarly, it should conceal defenses and allocate defense resources randomly. |
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