Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms |
| |
| Authors: | Fuhito Kojima |
| |
| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Ottawa, Canada;2. Department of Management, Economics and Social Sciences, University of Cologne, Germany;1. Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and Barcelona GSE, Campus UAB, 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain;2. ISEG–UL, Universidade de Lisboa; REM–Research in Economics and Management; UECE–Research Unit on Complexity and Economics, Portugal;3. Departamento de Análisis Económico, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), Paseo Senda del Rey 11, 28040 Madrid, Spain;1. Département de Sciences Économiques and CIREQ, Université de Montréal, Montréal, QC H3C 3J7, Canada;2. Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, United States;3. Center for International Development, Harvard University, 79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States;1. Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, United States;2. Harvard University, United States;3. University of California, Los Angeles, United States;4. Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, United States;1. McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, United States;2. Society of Fellows, Department of Economics, Center of Mathematical Sciences and Applications, Center for Research on Computation and Society, and Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, United States;3. Harvard Business School, Boston, MA, United States;4. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, United States |
| |
| Abstract: | Stability is a central concept in matching theory, while nonbossiness is important in many allocation problems. We show that these properties are incompatible: there does not exist a matching mechanism that is both stable and nonbossy. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
