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A Generalized Nash Equilibrium network model for post-disaster humanitarian relief
Affiliation:1. Department of Operations and Information Management, Isenberg School of Management, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003, United States;2. Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003, United States;1. Université de Lyon, DISP Laboratory, 160 bd de l''université, 69500 Bron, France;2. Université de Toulouse-Mines Albi, Route de Teillet, 81013 Albi, France;3. INSEAD, Bld de Constance, 77300 Fontainebleau, France;4. Universite Toulouse-Mines Albi, Route de Teillet, 81013 Albi, France;1. Department of Industrial Engineering, Amirkabir University of Technology, 424 Hafez Avenue, Tehran, Iran;2. Department of Industrial Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran;1. Beijing Technology and Business University, Haidian, BJ, China;2. University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, Milwaukee, USA;3. Dept. of Operations Management & Strategy, School of Management, University at Buffalo, NY, USA;1. Department of Industrial Engineering, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, USA;2. Department of System Design and Control Engineering, Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology, Ulsan, Republic of Korea
Abstract:We develop a Generalized Nash Equilibrium network model for post-disaster humanitarian relief by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs derive utility from providing relief supplies to victims of the disaster at demand points in a supply chain context while competing with each other for financial funds provided by donations. The shared constraints consist of lower and upper bounds for demand for relief items at the demand points to reduce materiel convergence or congestion. This game theory problem is reformulated as an optimization problem and numerical examples and a theoretical case study on Hurricane Katrina given.
Keywords:Disaster relief  Humanitarian logistics  Financial funds  Supply chains  Competition for funds  Materiel convergence  NGOs  Optimization  Generalized Nash Equilibrium  Variational inequalities
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