The asymptotic shapley value for a simple market game |
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Authors: | Thomas M. Liggett Steven A. Lippman Richard P. Rumelt |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Mathematics, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA;(2) Anderson School of Management, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA |
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Abstract: | We consider the game in which b buyers each seek to purchase 1 unit of an indivisible good from s sellers, each of whom has k units to sell. The good is worth 0 to each seller and 1 to each buyer. Using the central limit theorem, and implicitly convergence to tied down Brownian motion, we find a closed form solution for the limiting Shapley value as s and b increase without bound. This asymptotic value depends upon the seller size k, the limiting ratio b/ks of buyers to items for sale, and the limiting ratio of the excess supply relative to the square root of the number of market participants. This work was sponsered in part by NSF Grant DMS-03-01795. |
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Keywords: | Shapley value Core Many players |
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