A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem |
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| Authors: | Anna Bogomolnaia Herv Moulin |
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| Institution: | Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, P.O. Box 750496, Dallas, Texas, 75275-0496, f1;Department of Economics, Rice University, MS 22, P.O. Box 1892, Houston, Texas, 77251-1892, , f2 |
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| Abstract: | A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to individual preferences over sure objects. Ordinal efficiency implies (is implied by) ex post (ex ante) efficiency. A simple algorithm characterizes ordinally efficient assignments: our solution, probabilistic serial (PS), is a central element within their set. Random priority (RP) orders agents from the uniform distribution, then lets them choose successively their best remaining object. RP is ex post, but not always ordinally, efficient. PS is envy-free, RP is not; RP is strategy-proof, PS is not. Ordinal efficiency, Strategyproofness, and equal treatment of equals are incompatible. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D61, D63. |
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| Keywords: | random assignment ordinal ex post or ex ante efficiency strategyproofness envy-free |
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