Multiperson Bargaining over Two Alternatives |
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Authors: | Clara Ponsati József Sákovics |
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Institution: | aDepartment d'Economia, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193, Bellaterra, Spain;bInstitut d'Anàlisi Econòmica, CSIC, Campus UAB, 08193, Bellaterra, Spain |
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Abstract: | We present a continuous-time model of multiperson bargaining with incomplete information, where only two agreements are possible. We show that under mild informational assumptions, players behave as if they were representing the other players who prefer the same alternative, individually playing a war-of-attrition against a conglomerate player of the opposite side. We also provide a characterization of the perfect Bayesian equilibria in undominated strategies of the game, which yields a unique outcome in most cases.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C78, D72, D74. |
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