省以下财政分权、转移支付与地方政府规模——对中国县级数据的分析

中国的省以下分权改革由地方政府参照中央与省的制度安排自行调整,省内财政体制的安排存在较大差异.文章利用中国的县级面板数据实证检验了省以下财政分权与地方政府规模的关系,结果表明, "双重援助依赖"的地方财政制度显著扩张了地方政府规模,其原因主要在于地方官员的"横财效应"机制和转移支付存在的严重"粘蝇纸效应".因此,想要约束政府规模的膨胀,一个有效的方式便是通过制度安排消除省内地方政府的"双重援助依赖"格局,通过县级政府竞争提高地方政府运营效率.

Intraregional Fiscal Decentralization, Grant and Local Government Size Based on Evidence from China

The fiscal decentralization reform is made by local government according to the system of central and province government fiscal relationship.Intraregional fiscal decentralization shows significant difference.This paper empirically tests the relationship of intraregional fiscal decentralization and local government size and the results show that "doubling grant dependency" expands local government size.We should remove the situation of "doubling grant dependency" and boost the local government’s efficiency by enhancing the county government’s competition.