Bargaining with a possibly committed seller |
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Authors: | Roman Inderst |
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Institution: | London School of Economics, Department of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK;INSEAD, CEPR |
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Abstract: | We consider negotiations with an open time horizon where a buyer has private information about his valuation and does not know whether the seller is committed to the advertised price. This setting combines two common specifications made in the non-cooperative bargaining literature: one side is privately informed about its valuation, which is drawn from a continuum, and the other side is possibly committed to a fixed offer. We analyze the game both in discrete and in continuous time and show convergence of the two settings, which extends results from Abreu and Gul 2000. Bargaining and reputation. Econometrica 68, 85–117]. One interesting result is that as time proceeds, the non-committed seller becomes less likely to concede in a given period, i.e., it appears as if he becomes more “stubborn.” We further show that a seller may prefer to negotiate with a “worse” buyer as this enhances the value of his possible commitment. |
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Keywords: | Bargaining Commitment Coase conjecture |
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