| 规模报酬递增的第二种机制:为什么重复建设与规模效率的提高可以并存 |
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| 引用本文： | 付强.规模报酬递增的第二种机制:为什么重复建设与规模效率的提高可以并存[J].中国工业经济,2011(2). |
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| 作者姓名： | 付强 |
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| 作者单位： | 山东大学经济学院; |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金课题“转轨经济条件下网络型产业竞争政策研究”(批准号70973066) |
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| 摘 要： | 本文探讨了政府竞争格局下行业规模报酬递增的机制。我们发现,经典的规模报酬递增机制会导致垄断竞争条件下的厂商均衡数目减少,因而规模效率的提高与重复建设不可能同时出现。但是地方政府降低厂商固定成本的竞争却可以在重复建设的同时带来规模效率的提高,这就是本文所发现的政府竞争格局下行业规模报酬递增的第二种机制。我们通过DEA-VRS模型和DEA-Malmquist指数法初步证实了此过程。实证研究发现,在控制了干中学和货币外部性之后,地区行政垄断指数与规模效率的动态变动呈现显著的倒U形关系。
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| 关 键 词： | 政府竞争 规模报酬递增 重复建设 规模效率 |
The Second Mechanism of Increasing Returns to Scale:Why Increasing Scale Efficiency and Duplicate Construction Can Coexist |
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| FU Qiang.The Second Mechanism of Increasing Returns to Scale:Why Increasing Scale Efficiency and Duplicate Construction Can Coexist[J].China Industrial Economy,2011(2). |
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| Authors: | FU Qiang |
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| Institution: | FU Qiang (School of Economics of Shandong University,Jinan 250100,China) |
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| Abstract: | Through theoretical and empirical analysis,we reanalyze the mechanism of increasing returns to scale under the framework of government competition.We discover that competition of lowering the price of factors will lead to duplicate construction and make the industry realize increasing returns to scale,which has to depend on distortion at different time and to different extent.We make use of DEA-VRS model to prove it.We also discover that market segmentation will cause scale inefficiency equilibrium.We use D... |
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| Keywords: | government competition increase returns to scale duplicate construction scale efficiency |
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