Rent Sharing and the Compensation of Head Coaches in Power Five College Football |
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Authors: | Michael A. Leeds Eva Marikova Leeds Aaron Harris |
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Affiliation: | 1.Department of Economics,Temple University,Philadelphia,USA;2.Department of Economics and Business,Moravian College,Bethlehem,USA;3.Department of Statistics,Texas A&M University,Bath,USA |
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Abstract: | The monopoly and monopsony power of intercollegiate sports create significant rents, but previous studies of intercollegiate football coaches’ salaries implicitly assume that coaches are paid their marginal revenue products. In a two-stage estimation, we show that coaches share in these rents. The first stage shows that several common measures of coaches’ productivity do not affect an athletic department’s variable revenue. When we include these measures in the second-stage salary equation, their impact on pay reflects bargaining power, not productivity. We also find that several measures of fixed revenue, which are independent of the coach’s performance, increase the coach’s pay. |
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