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基于相互威慑模型的国际工程索赔谈判博弈研究
引用本文:吉格迪,姚智瑞.基于相互威慑模型的国际工程索赔谈判博弈研究[J].中小企业管理与科技,2021(11):108-109.
作者姓名:吉格迪  姚智瑞
作者单位:内蒙古工业大学经济管理学院
摘    要:随着我国世界经济地位的不断提升,国家地位差异对我国对外承包工程项目索赔谈判的影响变得越来越显著。在发生工期延误后,业主与承包商总会在工期索赔和费用索赔等方面产生冲突,解决冲突最好的方法就是协商谈判。论文通过对相互威慑模型和博弈论在索赔谈判中的应用分析,解析不对等经济地位下承包商与业主索赔的谈判过程,为双方在索赔谈判中作出科学合理的决策提供依据。

关 键 词:相互威慑  索赔  讨价还价  冲突管理

A Game Study of International Engineering Claims Negotiation Based on Mutual Deterrence Model
JI Ge-di,YAO Zhi-rui.A Game Study of International Engineering Claims Negotiation Based on Mutual Deterrence Model[J].Management & Technology of SME,2021(11):108-109.
Authors:JI Ge-di  YAO Zhi-rui
Institution:(School of Economics and Management,Inner Mongolia University of Technology,Hohhot 010051,China)
Abstract:With the continuous improvement of China’s world economic status,the impact of national status differences on the claim negotiation of China’s foreign contracted projects has become more and more significant.After the delay of construction period,the owner and the contractor will always have conflicts on the claim of construction period and cost.The best way to solve the conflict is negotiation.Through the analysis of the application of mutual deterrence model and game theory in claim negotiation,this paper analyzes the claim negotiation process between the contractor and the owner under unequal economic status,so as to provide the basis for both parties to make scientific and reasonable decisions in claim negotiation.
Keywords:mutual deterrence  claim  bargaining  conflict management
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