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财政购买性支出执行行为之司法规制
引用本文:叶姗. 财政购买性支出执行行为之司法规制[J]. 财贸研究, 2009, 20(2)
作者姓名:叶姗
作者单位:北京大学法学院,北京,100871
摘    要:公共权力的行使原则上不受司法审查,司法对抽象的财政支出行为的规制乏力,由此,造成财政支出行为可诉性较弱的现象。引入司法权规制财政购买性支出执行行为,可以解决其可诉性的缺陷,以使其纳入法治财政的轨道,防止政府滥用财政支出的权力。司法规制财政购买性支出行为的制度进路,除了依仗救济私人经营者利益的直接诉讼机制外,还可考虑创建救济公共消费者利益的间接诉讼机制。可见,建构实现其可诉性的诉讼机制,可以均衡国家、私人经营者和公共消费者之间的经济利益。

关 键 词:财政购买性支出  执行行为  司法规制

Legal Regulation of Executive Behavior of Financial Purchase Expenditure
YE Shan. Legal Regulation of Executive Behavior of Financial Purchase Expenditure[J]. Finance and Trade Research, 2009, 20(2)
Authors:YE Shan
Affiliation:Law School;Peking University;Beijing 100871
Abstract:Execution of public power is exempted from jurisdiction in principle, and abstract financial purchase expenditure is regulated weakly by jurisdiction, which renders weaker justifiable nature of financial purchase expenditure. Legal regulation of executive behavior of financial purchase expenditure can improve its justifiable nature, bring it into orbit of rule of law of finance and prevent government from abuse of its power. The institutional approach of legal regulation of financial purchase expenditure de...
Keywords:financial purchase expenditure  executive behavior  legal regulation  
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