| 对董事注意义务和忠诚义务的渊源分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 佐藤孝弘. 对董事注意义务和忠诚义务的渊源分析[J]. 经济与管理, 2011, 0(9) |
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| 作者姓名： | 佐藤孝弘 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京大学企业与公司法研究中心; |
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| 摘 要： | 当事人之间的权力不对称容易导致董事的忠诚义务的形成,忠实义务等董事的义务的产生与一方拥有权力而另外一方相对没有权力的情况有关,但是其更重要的原因是委托人对受托人产生的信赖。美国的董事承担注意义务和忠诚义务的渊源是受托义务,日本则是委任合同,两者有所不同。信托理论能更好地说明忠诚义务产生的原因。而与信托理论相比,委任理论对信赖的保护的必要性程度相对比较低,委任理论只能说明注意义务的产生。
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| 关 键 词： | 信托 委任 董事义务 |
An Analysis on the Duty of Care and Loyalty Obligations of the Directors |
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| Sato Xiaohong. An Analysis on the Duty of Care and Loyalty Obligations of the Directors[J]. Economy and Management, 2011, 0(9) |
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| Authors: | Sato Xiaohong |
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| Affiliation: | Sato Xiaohong(Enterprise and Company Law Research Center,Beijing University,Beijing 100871,China) |
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| Abstract: | The power asymmetry between parties is easy to cause the formation of the loyalty duty of the director,generation of duty of loyalty and director duties is related with that one has the power and the other party relatively has little power,but the more important reason is the trust of principal to the trustee.The origin of duty of care and loyalty to the obligations of United States is the fiduciary obligations,Japan has the commission contract,and both are different.Trust theory can better explain the caus... |
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| Keywords: | trust appointment director obligations |
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