上市公司大股东控制下的资本配置行为研究——基于控制权收益视角的实证分析

基于控制权收益①驱动公司资本配置行为的理论阐释,结合我国上市公司特有的股权结构及其导致的控制权分配格局,文章从固定资产投资和股权投资两个方面,对形成我国上市公司控制权收益的资本配置行为进行了实证研究。研究结果表明:(1)控制权收益水平与资本配置规模显著正相关;(2)控制权收益水平越高,则增加等量控制权收益所需的资本配置规模就越大;(3)较固定资产投资而言,通过股权并购方式取得控制权收益的代价较低,但控制性股东占有被并购公司控制权收益的比例也较低;(4)上市公司资本配置行为在形成控制权收益的同时并没有通过提高公司业绩而增加控制权的共享收益,资本配置决策在很大程度上是大股东控制下的自利行为。

A Research of the Capital Allocation Behavior under the Large Shareholders'' Control in Listed Companies——Empirical Evidence Based on the Control Benefit

Based on the theory of control benefit driving capital allocation and the assignment of control in Chinese listed companies under their special equity structure,this paper initially conducts the empirical study on these companies' capital allocation behaviors which will result in control benefit from the perspective of fixed assets investment and equity mergers.The conclusions are:(1)Control benefit is significantly positive with the scale of capital allocation;(2)The higher the control benefit is,the more capital it will be used to obtain a same level of benefit;(3)Compared with the fixed asset investment,the equity merger has a lower cost for obtaining control benefit,but leads to relatively lower benefit proportion for the control shareholder;(4)Although capital allocation results in control benefit,it does not increase public control benefit by improving corporate performance,so decision-making for capital allocation is more likely to be the self- beneficial behaviors of the control shareholder.