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From Libertinism to Marital Commitment: The Economics of Marital Search with Heterogeneous Agents
Authors:Gaelle?Le?Guirriec  author-information"  >  author-information__contact u-icon-before"  >  mailto:gaelle.leguirriec@reims-ms.fr"   title="  gaelle.leguirriec@reims-ms.fr"   itemprop="  email"   data-track="  click"   data-track-action="  Email author"   data-track-label="  "  >Email author,Nicolas?Vaillant
Affiliation:(1) Département Economie,Laboratoire d"rsquo"Economie Publique (3DI-LEP), Reims Management School, Université Paris II-ASSAS, 59 rue Pierre Taittinger, (BP302), 51061 Cedex, Reims, France;(2) Laboratoire Economie-Droit-Justice (OMI-EDJ), Laboratoire d"rsquo"Economie Publique (3DI-LEP), Université de Reims,Université Paris II-ASSAS, France
Abstract:Synopsis The actual characteristics and desires of candidates or marriage cannot be clearly identified without careful examination (Anderson & Hamori 2000). Accordingly, the classified advertisement system looks like a lsquomarket or lemonsrsquo (Akerlof 1970), which sharply contrasts with the matchmaking agency system. The continued existence of classified advertisement system just proves it furthers the goals of certain singles—namely, libertine females and libertine males. The present paper uses two databases: the first database consists of a sample of personal advertisements extracted from a specialized publication; the second database is the customer file of a matchmaking agency. This paper predicts which variables will determine the commitment level desired by individuals and why matchmaking agenciesrsquo customers are more sincere than advertisers.
Keywords:adverse selection  libertine males and females  matchmaking agency (marriage bureau)  personal ads  search for partners
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