The theory of public goods: non-nash behaviour |
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Authors: | Richard Cornes Todd Sandler |
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Affiliation: | The Faculties, Australian National University, Canberra 2600, A.C.T., Australia;University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82070, USA |
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Abstract: | Most treatments of equilibrium public goods provision assume zero conjectural variations in the sense that each individual regards the behaviour of the rest of the community as independent of his own. This paper introduces nonzero conjectural variations into the model. A diagram is introduced which can depict both the individual's and the community's equilibrium in the presence of nonzero conjectural variations. Equilibrium and optimal outcomes are compared, and a specific functional form is used to investigate the effect of community size on the nature of equilibrium. Finally, we discuss the requirement that conjectures should be consistent. |
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