A two-dimensional problem of revenue maximization |
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Authors: | Omer Lev |
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Affiliation: | aSchool of Engineering and Computer Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 91904 Jerusalem, Israel |
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Abstract: | We consider the problem of finding the mechanism that maximizes the revenue of a seller of multiple objects. This problem turns out to be significantly more complex than the case where there is only a single object (which was solved by Myerson, 1981). The analysis is difficult even in the simplest case studied here, where there are two exclusive objects and a single buyer, with valuations uniformly distributed on triangular domains. We show that the optimal mechanisms are piecewise linear with either 2 or 3 pieces, and obtain explicit formulas for most cases of interest. |
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Keywords: | Auctions Multi-dimensional mechanism design Incentive compatibility Mechanism design |
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