| Abstract: | Conclusion The Soviet and Western data on lead-times in invention, innovation, construction and diffusion appear to imply that the Soviet equilibrium technology gap is of the order of 10 to 15 years. If Soviet static inefficiency levels are as high as those reported by the Hanson-Hill and Rothlingshofer-Vogel studies, then the innovation and productivity slowdown in the years since 1975 may be interpreted as the consequence of the Soviet industry concluding the catching-up process and reaching its culture—and system related technological and productivity equilibrium gaps. Consequently, a state of maturity has been reached in which the duality factor no longer plays any significant role.The other factors—such as bottlenecks in productive infrastructures, a greater share of Siberian investiments, increasing complexity of the Soviet economy, lower growth of the Soviety R&D activity, lower labour morale and poorer work discipline and effort—may also have contributed to the slowdown. Our data on lead-times and manning levels relate to the 1960s and early 1970s. This paper suggests that we do not need to assume that these leads and levels have since changed for the worse to explain the post-1975 slowdown. However, the quality of these data is such that there is still considerable room for the influence of some or all of these other factors. A multitude of partial or alternative explanations can therefore live peacefully side by side and no  definite explanation of the slowdown can be expected. At the same time care should be taken to differentiate the symptoms, or the effects of growth slowdown, from its causes. One recent analysis of Soviet industrial slowdown discusses the evidence of slower investment growth, shortages of materials, energy constraints, and transportation bottlenecks (Schroeder (1985)). But investment goods, materials, energy supplies and transportation services are inputs which are themselves outputs. Their lower growth rates are therefore likely to be just intermediary, or short-term in cases of bottlenecks, causes of productivity slowdown, rather than the ultimate ones.The reader may have noted that this paper would not provide much comfort to Mr Gorbachev if his aim is, as it appears to be, to resume the catching-up of the TFA. At the same time our analysis suggests that the prediction of a continuing and significant technological and productivity regress vis-à-vis the TFA, one which a straight extrapolation of the performance during 1950–85 does imply for the post-1985 years, would be premature. Yet some movement in either direction from what I maintain to be essentially a growth equilibrium position, cannot be exclused. But unless systemic changes are really substantial, and Gorbachev's reforms do not appear to be of this category, these movements are in my view unlikely to be significant, especially since some new factors tend to counteract others (Hewett (1985); Hanson (1985)).London School of Economics. This paper is a much extended version of my American Economic Review (1986b) paper. The text benefited from seminar presentations of early ideas at Vienna's Institute for Comparative Economics, Stanford's Hoover Institution, Harvard's Russian Center, and at the London School of Economics. It was written during my fellowship at the Harriman Institute of Columbia University in the Spring of 1986. I wish to thank very much the Institute's directors and staff for their help and care. I also wish to thank Wlodzimierz Brus, Richard Ericson, Holland Hunter, Kazimierz Poznanski and Peter Wiles for their detailed and most helpful comments. Finally, the paper benefited much from absorbing a series of useful points and suggestions by its referees for this journal. |
