重点生态区位商品林生态补偿利益相关者演化博弈研究

根据演化博弈理论,构建动态演化博弈模型,探讨重点生态区位商品林生态补偿过程中各利益主体在有限理性条件下的利益驱动、决策行为和依据以及主体间交互作用下的演化稳定策略,分析在不同情境下影响林农和地方政府演化博弈均衡的因素。研究结果表明:两大博弈主体的策略选择和策略演化方向依赖于初始状态及其演化路径,并与博弈矩阵的参数有关;地方政府的行为决策直接影响生态补偿项目的可持续性;作为项目的直接实施主体,林农的积极性与响应度直接影响生态补偿项目的实施效果。因此,应该建立健全生态补偿,完善生态环境保护激励机制,构建政府主导、林农参与的环境保护工作机制。

Research on the Stakeholder Evolution Game of Ecological Compensation for Commercial Forests in Key Ecological Locations

⑴ Background——As a forestry policy,the formulation and implementation of ecological compensation for commercial forests in key ecological locations involves the different interest demands of multiple interest groups,together with the multifunctional characteristics of forest resources themselves,which leads to the complexity and diversity of forestry policies in the process of formulation and implementation.Faced with the commercial forests that have been distributed to households,how governments at all levels solve the problem of "governments get green and forest farmers get profit" has been concerned by many scholars.⑵ Methods——Based on the stakeholder theory and game theory,this paper constructs a game model for dynamic evolution to explore the interest-driven,decision-making behavior and basis of stakeholders under the condition of bounded rationality,as well as the evolutionary stabilization strategy under the interaction of stakeholders.⑶ Results——It can be concluded that:first,only when the benefits of forest farmers' participation in commercial forest protection are greater than the short-term benefits under unprotected circumstances can forest farmers have the incentive to protect commercial forest resources.Reasonable ecological compensation standards or expanding the benefits of forest farmers' engagement in other production are the core to ensure that forest farmers change their traditional livelihood and participate in commercial forest protection;second,local governments have a high degree of influence and appeal in ecological compensation.When they implement the policies of ecological compensation for commercial forests with a probability greater than(C_1-U_1+U_2)÷W,the decision-making of forest farmers' behaviors will evolve accordingly,that is,they gradually converge to the protection from not participating in the protection of commercial forests,and then to a desired stable state;Third,the punishment of local governments for deforestation will also affect the behavior choice of forest farmers.⑷ Conclusions and Discussions——The behavior choice of forest farmers is affected by the trade-off between the actual net income obtained by participating in the protection of commercial forests and the net income not participating in the protection.The game results of the decision-making parties and the benefits and costs of the forest farmers' implementation of the protection strategy,the probability of local government implementing policies,the cost of implementing policies,and the penalties imposed on forest farmers are closely related.Therefore,the following suggestions are put forward:first,based on the value of ecosystem service system,establish scientific ecological compensation standards and diversified ecological compensation mechanisms.Second,Establish multi-level ecological environmental protection incentives.Third,we should establish a government-led environmental protection mechanism with the participation of forest farmers.