Cooperation without coordination: signaling,types and tacit collusion in laboratory oligopolies |
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Authors: | Douglas Davis Oleg Korenok Robert Reilly |
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Institution: | (1) Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-4000, USA |
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Abstract: | We study the effects of price signaling activity and underlying propensities to cooperate on tacit collusion in posted offer
markets. The primary experiment consists of an extensively repeated baseline sequence and a ‘forecast’ sequence that adds
to the baseline a forecasting game that allows identification of signaling intentions. Forecast sequence results indicate
that signaling intentions differ considerably from those that are counted under a standard signal measure based on previous
period prices. Nevertheless, we find essentially no correlation between either measure of signal volumes and collusive efficiency.
A second experiment demonstrates that underlying seller propensities to cooperate more clearly affect collusiveness. |
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